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Over the past 30 years, employer-sponsored defined contribution (DC) savings plans 
have displaced defined benefit (DB) pensions in the private sector. There were 2.4 active DB 
participants for each active DC participant in the private sector in 1975, but these proportions 
had more than flipped by 2007, when there were 3.4 active DC participants for each active DB 
participant (U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Benefit Security Administration, 2008 and 
2010). Several factors have been implicated in this shift, including increased regulatory costs for 
DB providers following the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
in 1974, the legislated creation of an attractive (to employers) alternative to the DB pension 
through section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code in 1978, and workers‘ interest in portable 
pension benefits as the labor force has become more mobile. 
The picture in the public sector is very different. In most jurisdictions, a DB pension is 
still the primary retirement income benefit offered to employees. However, some jurisdictions 
have followed the private sector and shifted towards a DC system. Going forward, fiscal 
pressures are likely to generate more movement in this direction. Even jurisdictions with a 
primary DB plan currently offer supplemental DC plans. 
The distinction between DB and DC plans is an important one. In a DB plan, participants 
have little impact on the income that they will receive in retirement other than through their 
choice of when to leave their job. Plan sponsors dictate the formula that determines the payments 
to retired participants. Sponsors also decide with the help of highly trained financial 
professionals how much money to save today to fund these future payments and where these 
savings are invested. 
  In a DC plan, participants usually must choose how much to spend out of their assets 
during retirement, how much to contribute to the plan before retirement, and how to invest plan 
assets with limited guidance from their employer or plan sponsor. The consequences of having 
individuals with low levels of financial sophistication make complicated financial decisions has 
been well-documented in the literature: individuals procrastinate, their savings outcomes are 
heavily influenced by plan design features such as employer-selected defaults, they place too 
much weight on information that is not relevant (e.g., past asset returns), and they place too little 
weight on information that is relevant (e.g., mutual fund fees). 4 
 
We begin this paper by surveying the retirement plans offered in the public sector, 
evaluating the generosity of the DB plans and describing the types of DC plans that are available. 
We find that public sector DB plans generally provide high income replacement rates during 
retirement for employees who retire from the public sector with long tenures, but even within 
this set of employees, there is a large amount of heterogeneity in the replacement rate across 
plans. In contrast, employees who leave the public sector with shorter tenures are not covered as 
generously. In public DC plans, mandatory employee contributions and employer contributions 
that are not contingent on employee choices are much more common than in private DC plans, 
and these combined contributions are often a large fraction of employee salary. We conclude by 
summarizing previous research findings on employee savings behavior in private DC plans and 
discussing how this research points to areas where the design of public sector pension plans 
could be improved. 
 
I. The Public Sector Pension Landscape 
A. Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans in the Public Sector 
In the United States, there are over 2,500 different public employee retirement systems 
providing benefits to the over 20 million individuals employed in the public sector.
1 For most of 
these employees, the primary retirement income benefit is a DB pension plan. According to Snell 
(2010a), ―91 percent of full-time state and local government employees are covered by a 
traditional, defined benefit retirement plan.‖ Although DC plans are making some inroads in the 
public sector, quantifying their importance is difficult because the data collected on public sector 
retirement plans have largely focused on DB plans. 
Pensions & Investments has compiled data on the 1,000 largest retirement plan sponsors 
(public and private) in the U.S., as measured by assets under management (Pensions & 
Investments, 2010a and 2010b). Of the 1,000 largest plans in 2009, 222 are classified as public 
                                                             
1 The number of retirement systems comes from the U.S. Census Bureau: 
http://www.census.gov/govs/retire/2008ret05a.html (accessed August 4, 2010). The total number of retirement 
systems is comprised of 218 state systems, 160 county systems, 2,054 municipal/township systems, and 118 school 
and special district systems. The number of public sector employees comes from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat15.pdf (accessed August 5, 2010). 5 
 
plans.
2 Among these public plans, DB plans predominate: only 6% of total assets under 
management are in DC plans. But 94 of the 222 largest public pension plan sponsors have a DC 
component, and 38 of these plans have over $1 billion in DC assets.
3 
  To get a more complete picture of the role of DC plans in the public sector, we compiled 
information on the retirement plans offered to new hires in 2010 in all 50 states, the District of 
Columbia, the 20 largest cities, and the 20 largest counties in the U.S. (as measured by 
population).
4 Some jurisdictions have a single plan for most or all public sector employees, 
whereas others have separate plans for different employee categories, such as teachers, public 
safety workers, and elected officials.
5 In Tables 1A (states plus Washington D.C.) and 1B 
(counties and cities), we list the plans available to a general public sector employee. Some plans 
appear in Table 1 multiple times; for example, a plan that covers workers employed by all levels 
of government within a state that contains a top-20 city and a top-20 county would show up three 
times as a plan covering state, county, and city employees. 
  Tables 1A and 1B show that DB plans are the predominant primary
6 retirement plan at all 
levels of state and local government. But eleven states and Washington D.C. have some sort of 
DC component in their primary retirement plan, either a DC only plan, a hybrid DB/DC plan 
(which combines a DB component with a DC component that is distinct from the state‘s 
supplemental DC plans), or a plan that allows employees to choose a DC or a hybrid DB/DC 
plan instead of a DB plan. These DC and hybrid DB/DC offerings are largely recent with all but 
one being incorporated in the past 15 years.
7 Fewer large cities and counties have a primary plan 
with a DC component: only seven of the 40 jurisdictions in Table 1B. 
  Regardless of the nature of their primary retirement plan, all of the jurisdictions in Tables 
1A and 1B have an optional supplemental DC plan available to employees, and a non-trivial 
                                                             
2 Pensions & Investments classifies plans as being corporate, public, union, or miscellaneous. A handful of plans 
classified as ―miscellaneous‖ appear to be public plans (e.g., the Federal Retirement Thrift plan and the Illinois State 
Universities plan). In the numbers reported here, we follow the Pensions & Investments categorization. 
3 By comparison, private sector companies like Apple and 7-Eleven have roughly $1 billion in DC assets under 
management and no DB assets. 
4 For more information on the legislative history of state defined contribution savings plans, see Snell (2010b). 
5 The determinants of the plan types offered to different groups of public employees is a potential area for future 
research. For example, do DC plans tend to be offered to employees who are best equipped to make good choices in 
them? 
6 We define a primary plan as one that is not optional, and a supplemental plans as one in which participation is 
voluntary.  
7 Washington D.C. made the switch to its defined contribution plan in 1987. 6 
 
fraction have multiple supplemental options. The need for these supplemental DC plans depends 
on how well the primary plan is meeting employees‘ retirement income needs. 
 
B. The Adequacy of State Defined Benefit Pensions 
  Public sector DB pensions are often perceived by the public as being quite generous. To 
see how accurate this perception is, we calculate the extent to which employment automatically 
generates an annuity stream of income for a stylized public sector employee,
8 Joe the Bachelor, 
in each state, assuming Joe retires on January 1, 2010. The metric we use is Joe‘s replacement 
rate after taxes and retirement plan contributions: (after-tax automatic retirement annuity income 
in first retirement year) ÷ (after-tax salary in final work year – mandatory retirement plan 
contributions in final work year). We include state DB plan payments (or payments from the DB 
component of a state hybrid plan) and Social Security payments in Joe‘s automatic annuity 
income. Even though Joe is retiring on January 1, 2010, we assume that he worked his entire 
career under the pension rules being offered to new hires in 2010. 
Befitting his name, Joe has never married and has no dependents. The absence of spousal 
labor and pension income means that the automatic replacement rate we calculate for Joe 
approximates the ratio of his retirement consumption to his pre-retirement consumption if he 
does no saving outside the DB pension both before and after retirement. Of course, the before-
tax generosity of Joe‘s state pension benefits does not depend upon his marital status or number 
of dependents, at least as long as he is alive. 
We assume that Joe has a final pre-retirement salary of either $50,000 or $100,000, and 
has experienced 1% annual real wage growth up until age 60 and 0% nominal wage growth until 
his retirement at age 65. We consider six different work histories for Joe: 
A) Joe retires having worked for 40 years, all of it in the public sector 
B)  Joe retires having worked for 35 years, all of it in the public sector 
C)  Joe retires having worked for 35 years, the first 5 in the private sector and the last 30 
in the public sector 
                                                             
8 The analysis that follows assumes that Joe the bachelor is a general state employee. We have done the calculations 
in Appendix Table B1 assuming that Joe is a K-12 teacher in state, and the qualitative results are very similar (see 
Appendix B). Note that in some states, the same pension plan covers both general public employees and K-12 
teachers, whereas in other states these two groups of employees are covered by separate plans. 7 
 
D) Joe retires having worked for 35 years, the first 30 in the private sector and the last 5 
in the public sector 
E)  Joe retires having worked for 35 years, the first 15 in the private sector and the last 20 
in the public sector 
F)  Joe retires having worked for 35 years, the first 20 in the public sector and the last 15 
in the private sector 
Note that in every scenario, the replacement rate Joe would get later in retirement could 
be different than our calculations here due to cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). Appendix A 
(available online) includes more details on the assumptions and methodology we use to calculate 
Joe‘s automatic replacement rate, the values of the automatic replacement rate we calculate for 
Joe in each state, each state‘s tax treatment of labor income and pension income, and whether 
each state‘s employees participate in Social Security. 
Table 2 shows summary statistics of the automatic replacement rates, broken out by Joe‘s 
final salary, work history, and the type of plan offered by the state. A state that offers employees 
a choice of plans appears in multiple plan categories—once in each category it offers. 
Under most of the scenarios we consider where Joe‘s final income is $50,000, the 
average automatic replacement rate in plans with at least some DB component is close to or 
exceeds the 70 to 75% replacement rate that is often considered adequate. As a point of 
comparison, Munnell and Soto (2005) calculate that the median U.S. single individual who 
retired with an employer-sponsored pension between 1999 and 2003 receives Social Security 
plus pension annuity income (assuming all DC assets are annuitized) equal to 56% of his average 
income in the highest five out of the last ten years prior to retirement.
9 Nonetheless, a need for 
additional savings remains—even for many public sector employees covered by a DB plan—for 
several reasons.  
First, because the Social Security system is progressive, Joe‘s average replacement rate is 
decreasing in his final salary.
10 For example, when Joe has a 35 year career entirely spent in the 
public sector, his replacement rate in DB-only plans is 10 percentage points lower on average 
with a $100,000 final income than with a $50,000 final income. 
                                                             
9 This comparison shows that public sector compensation appears to be more back-loaded than private sector 
compensation. It does not show that public sector compensation is more generous than private sector compensation. 
10 The only time Joe‘s replacement rate is not affected by his final salary is in states with DC-only plans whose 
employees do not participate in Social Security. The replacement rate in these states is 0% regardless of Joe‘s 
income. 8 
 
Second, in the DB-only plans and the hybrid DB/DC plans, Joe‘s automatic replacement 
rate falls if he has spent less time working in the public sector. This is because the typical DB 
pension formula increases benefits with years of service.
11 If Joe‘s last job is in the public sector 
with a final income of $50,000, his average replacement rate in a DB-only plan decreases by 8 
percentage points as his years of public sector work decrease from 40 to 35, by another 8 
percentage points as his tenure decreases from 35 to 30, and by another 17 percentage points as 
his tenure decreases from 30 to 20. If Joe works only five years in the public sector, there are 
many states whose DB systems do not give Joe any automatic annuity because he does not 
satisfy the plan vesting requirements. Thus, Joe‘s automatic annuity income would come solely 
from Social Security. In most of these states, Joe would receive a refund of his contributions to 
the state pension system if the system requires employee contributions.
12 
Third, conditional on working partly in the public sector and partly in the private sector, 
Joe has a lower replacement rate if he ends his career in the private sector than if he ends his 
career in the public sector. This is because the DB pension formulas are a function of Joe‘s 
nominal final average salary in the public sector. For example, if Joe retires with a final average 
salary of $50,000 and works 20 years in the public sector and 15 years in the private sector, his 
average DB-only replacement rate is 20 percentage points higher if he retires from the public 
sector than if he retires from the private sector (96% versus 76%).  
Fourth, even holding fixed Joe‘s final income and work history, there is substantial 
heterogeneity in his automatic replacement rate across states. For example, with a final average 
salary of $50,000 and a 35-year career spent entirely in the public sector, the average 
replacement rate across all DB-only plans is 121%. If Joe worked in Pennsylvania, his 
replacement rate would be a much higher 150%. But if Joe worked in Maine, his replacement 
rate would be only 79%. Joe‘s average automatic replacement rate in states with hybrid DB/DC 
plans is lower on average than in the states with DB-only plans—90% versus 121%—as would 
be expected, since it is intended that Joe fund some of his retirement with assets in the DC 
component of these plans. There is also substantial variation in Joe‘s automatic replacement rate 
                                                             
11 In some states, the DB replacement rate is capped, so additional years of service do not increase pension benefits 
after some point. 
12 In most states with DB plans, if Joe leaves public sector employment before he is vested, only his contributions 
are refunded. He does not receive any investment return on his contributions nor any of the employer contributions 
made on his behalf. 9 
 
within the small number of hybrid DB/DC plans, ranging from a low of 44% in Ohio to a high of 
118% in Oregon. In DC-only plans, Joe‘s replacement rate is either 0% (in states whose newly 
hired employees do not participate in Social Security
13) or around 50% (the replacement rate that 
he gets from Social Security alone after taxes). 
The automatic replacement rates in Table 2 are derived assuming that Joe accumulates 
benefits for his entire career under the rules in place for employees newly hired today. How has 
this automatic replacement rate changed over time? Figure 1 plots one measure of this change for 
Joe if he works his entire 35-year career in the public sector (work history B above) and has a 
$50,000 final salary. The vertical axis is the highest automatic replacement rate Joe could get in 
his state if he spent his entire career under the rules for today‘s new hires. The horizontal axis is 
the most generous automatic replacement rate Joe could get if he spent his career under the rules 
actually experienced by employees who started working in 1975 and retired at the beginning of 
2010. 
Most states are fairly close to the 45-degree line, indicating that the automatic 
replacement rate has not changed much over time, at least for employees who spend their entire 
careers in the public sector. The few substantial changes have mostly lowered the automatic 
replacement rate; conditional upon changing, the average change is a 10 percentage point 
decrease. 
Several states have decreased the generosity of their DB pension in ways that do not 
show up in Figure 1. For example, an increase in the years of service at which employees vest 
would reduce the automatic replacement ratio of employees who leave the public sector with 
years of service between the old and the new vesting thresholds. Many states have adopted ―anti-
spiking provisions‖ to combat the practice of artificially inflating pay in the final year or two 
before retirement by taking extremely high amounts of overtime or getting short-term 
―promotions‖ into higher-paying positions. Since pension formulas depend on some measure of 
final average pay, spiking increases pension payouts in retirement.
14 We have assumed that Joe‘s 
pay is flat during his last five years before retirement, so the automatic replacement rates that we 
                                                             
13 Newly hired state employees in Alaska, Colorado, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada and Ohio do not 
make Social Security contributions, and their employer does not either. Consequently, their public sector earnings 
history is not counted in determining their Social Security benefits. 
14 In practice, anti-spiking provisions cap the annual salary growth that is used to calculate a worker‘s pension 
benefit. 10 
 
calculate are not influenced by spiking. States are also reducing the generosity of their retiree 
health insurance, a valuable benefit that we do not incorporate into our replacement rate 
calculation. The current fiscal situation facing many jurisdictions will likely precipitate many 
more such changes. To the extent that pensions are becoming less generous in some of the less 
visible ways discussed above, this may increase the need for supplemental DC savings. 
 
C. The Adequacy of State Defined Contribution Pensions 
  The adequacy of DC savings plans is more difficult to assess than that of DB plans 
because their adequacy often depends significantly on participant behavior: Are employees 
participating, how much are they contributing, and what type of asset allocation do they choose? 
In most private sector 401(k) plans, there are many ways employees can fall short (Munnell and 
Sundén, 2004): they can delay enrolling in the plan, choose a contribution rate that is too low to 
generate the necessary resources to maintain consumption in retirement, or choose an 
inappropriate asset allocation (e.g., investing heavily in employer stock, investing in high-fee 
funds, or investing in a manner that does not match their risk tolerance). 
  Table 3 lists some characteristics of states‘ primary DC plans. Optional supplementary 
DC plans and the DC component of hybrid DB/DC plans are not included in the table. In contrast 
to most private sector DC plans, plan contributions are mandatory for most state employees 
whose primary plan is the DC plan.
15 Thus, in the three states whose only primary plan is the DC 
plan, contributions to the DC plan are automatic and employees cannot opt out. In the states that 
allow employees to choose a DC plan as their primary plan, the default primary plan is the DB 
plan (or the hybrid DB/DC plan in the State of Washington), so mandatory DC plan 
contributions do not commence unless the employee actively enrolls in the DC plan. 
In the private sector, most DC plans are funded by elective employee contributions and 
an employer contribution that depends on the employee‘s contribution (e.g., the employer will 
match 50% of employee contributions up to 3% of pay). The contribution rules in state DC plans 
are usually very different. Only Michigan allows variable employee contributions that are 
matched by the employer, as is the norm in the private sector. Instead, state DC plans usually 
offer an employer contribution that is not contingent on employee contributions, ranging from 
                                                             
15 States often exempt some groups of employees from retirement plan participation, but these employee groups tend 
to be a small (e.g., temporary or part-time workers). 11 
 
4% of salary in Michigan to 10.15% of salary in Colorado. Most also fix the employee 
contribution at a level between 4% and 10% of salary, although two jurisdictions (Washington 
DC and Florida) do not allow employee contributions at all. 
One area where public and private sector DC plans are similar is the investment options 
offered. The number of investment options ranges from 10 to the low 20s with only one 
exception, South Carolina, which has four different investment fund managers and a total of 85 
funds. All of the fund menus have investment options that span the risk-expected return 
spectrum, and most include target date funds. The default fund is either an age-appropriate target 
date fund or a balanced fund with the exception of Michigan, where the default is a fixed income 
fund. This is in line with the private sector, which has also moved toward target date and 
balanced fund defaults that satisfy the Qualified Default Investment Alternative (QDIA) 
guidelines of the Pension Protection Act of 2006. 
Employees‘ own contributions are always immediately vested in state DC plans. The 
vesting of employer contributions varies across jurisdictions, from immediate vesting in South 
Carolina to cliff vesting after 5 years in Montana. Employees in most states become 
incrementally vested in their employer contributions over time, until they are fully vested after 4 
or 5 years. The range of state vesting schedules mirrors what we observe in private sector plans. 
Participants in state DC plans are less likely than participants in private sector DC plans 
to end up with extremely low retirement savings, since most states impose high minimum 
contribution rates. Colorado and Ohio require combined employer plus employee contribution 
rates in excess of 18%. Four other states mandate combined contribution rates greater than or 
equal to 10%. But some states have rather low mandatory combined contribution rates. 
Washington D.C. contributes only 5% of salary and allows no employee contributions, and North 
Dakota‘s combined mandatory contribution is 8.12% of salary, with no possibility for employees 
to contribute more. Michigan‘s minimum mandatory contribution rate is 4%, but employees can 
accumulate more by making additional optional employee contributions and earning the 
accompanying employer match. 
 12 
 
II. Behavioral Economics and Retirement Savings 
We now turn to a brief summary of the behavioral economics literature on retirement 
savings. In Section III, we will apply these research findings to the public sector retirement plans 
that we have described in Section I.  
Several recent papers document a pervasive lack of financial literacy in the U.S. 
population (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006 and 2007; Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto, 2010; 
Lusardi and Tufano, 2009; Applied Research and Consulting, 2009). This low level of financial 
literacy carries over to the specific domain of employer-sponsored retirement plans. Gustman, 
Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2007) and Chan and Stevens (2008) show that many Health and 
Retirement Survey respondents do not understand important features of their retirement plan, 
including whether the plan is a DB or a DC plan, the age at which they qualify for full benefits, 
and the relationship between continued work and future benefits. Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 
(forthcoming) similarly show that many employees in one DC savings plan do not know their 
employer match. Finally, Brown and Weisbenner (2009) document that individuals participating 
in the State Universities Retirement System of Illinois are confused about which plan option best 
meets their needs. 
Complicated financial decisions can be overwhelming for many individuals, especially 
those with little financial expertise and experience. Saving and investing for retirement can be 
especially daunting, as it involves making large long-term commitments in a domain in which 
many individuals will never develop significant expertise. Learning is hindered by the fact that 
each individual goes through the lifecycle savings problem only once, outcomes are realized with 
substantial delay and noise, and the rapid pace of financial innovation renders previously 
acquired knowledge obsolete. 
The consequences for savings plan outcomes have been well documented. Several broad 
patterns of behavior emerge from the literature. First, individuals procrastinate when faced with 
complicated choices. In the context of retirement saving, this often implies not saving at all. 
Carroll et al. (2009) document substantial procrastination in 401(k) savings plan enrollment in a 
large private sector savings plan, even though the costs of delay can be substantial (Choi, 
Laibson and Madrian, forthcoming). Conversely, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2009a) and 13 
 
Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2010a) show that simplifying the savings plan enrollment 
process leads to sizeable increases in participation. 
Second, savings and investment outcomes are heavily influenced by plan design features 
that matter little in standard economic models. The best evidence on this front is the sensitivity 
of outcomes to the plan defaults. Savings plan participation increases greatly following employer 
adoption of automatic enrollment, which changes the plan default from non-participation to 
participation, and contribution rates and asset allocations shift toward the automatic enrollment 
defaults (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick, 2004 and 2006; 
Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian, 2008). Allowing employees to choose automatic future 
contribution rates increases leads to sizeable future increases in savings (Thaler and Benartzi, 
2004). Portfolios are more heavily invested in employer stock when the employer match is 
invested by default in employer stock (Benartzi, 2001; Choi, Laibson and Madrian, 2009b). The 
fraction of pension beneficiaries choosing a joint and survivor annuity increased substantially 
when this option became the legal default for married individuals (Holden and Nicholson, 1998; 
Saku, 2005). 
Defaults are not the only plan design feature that significantly influences savings and 
investment outcomes. In plans without an employer match, discretionary employee contribution 
rates are influenced by whether mandatory contributions are labeled as employee or employer 
contributions (Card and Ransom, forthcoming). Several authors have found that asset allocation 
choices are sensitive to the structure of the investment menu (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Brown, 
Liang, and Weisbenner, 2007; Karlsson, Massa, and Simonov, 2007) and the form on which 
individuals must indicate their choices (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007). 
Third, individuals pay too much attention to irrelevant information and too little attention 
to relevant information. For example, individuals chase past returns in both their asset allocation 
choices (Benartzi, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick, 2004; Calvet, Campbell, and 
Sodini, 2009; Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2010) and contribution rate choices (Choi, Laibson, 
Madrian and Metrick, 2009) while paying too little attention to mutual fund fees (Choi, Laibson, 
and Madrian, 2010). 
A fourth pattern is a reliance on heuristics and rules of thumb in decision making. For 
example, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) document what they call ―naïve diversification‖: 14 
 
individuals diversify by investing in several different mutual funds, but they fail to account for 
the underlying correlations in returns across the funds when making their choices.
16 Choi, 
Laibson, Madrian and Metrick (2006) show that employees disproportionately choose 401(k) 
contribution rates that are divisible by 5. 
Finally, individuals do a poor job of integrating various aspects of their financial lives; 
rather, they appear to engage in mental accounting, making decisions in each subset of their 
portfolio without considering their choices in other subsets (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2009b; 
Card and Ransom, forthcoming).  
This long list of biases has complex implications for the overall adequacy of retirement 
savings. Depending on the institutional environment, some behavioral biases will generate 
excessive accumulation of retirement wealth whereas other biases will generate inadequate 
accumulation of retirement wealth.   
To illustrate the case of excess accumulation, consider an individual who has a large DB 
pension claim, but fails to fully account for that claim when making retirement savings decisions.  
For example, the individual might mentally segregate their DB claim and follow a simple 
heuristic in choosing an active savings rate in his DC account, for instance, save up to the match 
threshold, which is 6% of income in a typical private sector DC plan. Assuming that the 
employee‘s contributions are partially matched, the total implicit saving rate could far exceed 
20% once the DB accumulation and Social Security are also taken into account.  In this scenario, 
the individual might save far too much, particularly if he has a low level of labor income and a 
correspondingly high Social Security replacement rate. Likewise, consider a completely passive 
individual who works for an employer with a DB plan and also a DC plan that has automatic 
enrollment, an employer match, and automatic contribution escalation. In this setting, such a 
household might also end up saving far too much. 
On the other hand, the passive behavior noted above could lead to insufficient retirement 
wealth accumulation in other contexts. For example, a largely passive individual who works for 
an employer with neither a DB nor a DC savings plan could save far too little.   
Behavioral biases therefore predict a mixed picture of heterogeneous savings outcomes, 
with this heterogeneity driven by the interaction between behavioral biases (like passivity or 
                                                             
16 However, see the critique of this result by Huberman and Jiang (2006) 15 
 
mental accounting) and the individual‘s institutional environment. Researchers who study 
savings adequacy have reached differing conclusions about the extent to which individuals are 
financially prepared for retirement. Some argue that individuals are largely well-positioned (e.g. 
Sholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun, 2006; Engen, Gale and Uccello, 1999), while others conclude 
that most individuals are falling short of where they need to be (Munnell, Webb and Golub-Sass, 
2007). 
 
III. Implications for Public Sector Retirement Plans 
What are the implications of these behavioral patterns for thinking about how well public 
sector retirement plans meet the retirement income needs of public sector employees? 
We start by considering the situation of employees who have a primary DB plan. DB 
plans have been characterized as being less complicated than DC plans for their participants. 
Indeed, DC plans demand—or at least allow—a substantial amount of individual autonomy, 
whereas DB plans require almost no choices by participants before retirement. But there are 
many complicated features of DB plans that have implications for how employees use the 
supplemental DC savings plans they are offered.  
The formulas determining DB pension payouts seem relatively straightforward on the 
surface: final average salary multiplied by years of service multiplied by a retirement factor. But 
these formulas often have complicated wrinkles, such as limits on the growth in final wages that 
will count in the formula, future cost-of-living adjustments that are hard to value, and rules about 
the combination of age and years of service that must be attained to receive a full benefit. Many 
individuals have misconceptions about their retirement benefits, which may affect their choices 
about how much to save in their supplemental DC plans. 
DB plans reward tenure, since most payout formulas depend directly on years of service 
and some measure of final average pay, which is itself often related to tenure. Individuals who 
leave the public sector with relatively low levels of tenure will be entitled to very little or nothing 
at all. Although the common perception is that public sector workers are generally long-term 
employees, a recent Maine task force report claims that over half of public sector workers in 
Maine leave the public sector before reaching the 5 years of service necessary to vest (Maine 16 
 
URP Task Force, 2010). If this is true in other states as well, then more attention probably needs 
to be paid to supplemental DC plans in the public sector.  
Finally, the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) greatly complicates estimating the 
level of Social Security income that employees of six states (Colorado, Louisiana, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Nevada, and Ohio) will receive. While employed by these states, employees 
make no contributions to Social Security, and neither does their employer. Consequently, 
earnings from employment in these states are not counted towards determining Social Security 
benefits. But some employees have long enough careers to qualify for Social Security benefits in 
addition to their state pension. The WEP reduces Social Security payments to these employees. 
As explained on the Social Security web site: 
―Before 1983, people who worked mainly in a job not covered by Social Security had 
their Social Security benefits calculated as if they were long-term, low-wage workers. 
They had the advantage of receiving a Social Security benefit representing a higher 
percentage of their earnings, plus a pension from a job where they did not pay Social 
Security taxes. Congress passed the Windfall Elimination Provision to remove that 
advantage.‖ 
(Source: http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10045.html, accessed August 7, 2010.) 
The annual statements that Social Security sends to participants projecting their future benefits 
do not account for the effects of the WEP, so affected state employees may mistakenly believe 
that they are entitled to higher Social Security benefits than they will in fact receive, altering 
their savings and retirement decisions. 
In some states, employees have a choice of plans in which to participate, which adds yet 
another layer of complexity. Employees do not typically have the option of procrastinating 
indefinitely, because there is a deadline by which a decision must be made.
17 But in fact, the 
decision does not need to be explicitly made, since the employer specifies a default plan for 
individuals who do not state a preference. Table 4 lists the states that offer a choice of primary 
plan, which plan is their default option, and the fraction of new employees who end up in each 
option in the states from which were able to get that information. The default is the DB plan in 
all of the choice states except Washington, where the default is a hybrid DB/DC plan. Consistent 
with previous research, the large majority of employees—79% to 87%—end up in whichever 
plan is the default. 
                                                             
17 For the states with a plan choice in Table 1A, employees have between 30 days and twelve months to opt out of 
the default plan. 17 
 
Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2008) discuss several reasons why defaults are 
powerful. One may be particularly relevant here: the perception that the default is the employer-
endorsed option. Most workers probably lack the knowledge necessary to map each retirement 
plan to their preferences, so the default may be particularly likely to be perceived as the correct 
course of action. Yang (2005), Brown and Weisbenner (2009), and Goda and Manchester (2010) 
all document strong default effects among employees who have a choice between a DB and a DC 
plan (the employees studied by Brown and Weisbenner had a choice among three different 
plans). In the organization studied by Goda and Manchester, the default differed by age: 
employees older than 45 had a DB plan default, while employees younger than 45 had a DC plan 
default. Employees who are just above the age-45 cutoff are 60 percentage points more likely to 
be in the DB plan than employees who are just below the age-45 cutoff. Goda and Manchester‘s 
analysis suggests that following the age-based default rule was close to optimal ex ante for 
employees. However, even if the age-based default rule was optimal on average, there could be 
many employees who are swept up into a plan that is not optimal for them. The organizations 
studied by Yang (2005) and Brown and Weisbenner (2009) designated the DB plan as the default 
for all employees. Like Goda and Manchester, Yang finds that the default is very influential, 
especially for employees younger than 30, whom she calculates are least likely to benefit from 
being in the DB plan.
18 Brown and Weisbenner also find that the default is powerful, and 
employees who opt out of the default tend to choose a dominated non-default plan. 
Instead of having a default, employees could be required to actively choose their primary 
plan before a deadline. Carroll et al. (2009) study such a regime in a private 401(k) plan that 
required employees to actively choose a (possibly zero) contribution rate within 30 days of hire. 
This approach prevents employees from finding themselves in an inappropriate plan through 
passivity, but also places a heavy burden on employees to gather enough information to make a 
wise decision. Thus, active decision regimes are best accompanied by mechanisms that help 
employees quickly and easily understand their options. 
An interesting design choice is whether to make the plan choice reversible. In some 
states, the plan choice is irreversible, whereas in other states, employees have one or more 
opportunities to switch between plans. Reversibility may complicate the decision-making task 
                                                             
18 This result is consistent with the findings of Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2010b), who find that 
employees who accept a sub-optimal default contribution rate tend to be of lower socio-economic status. 18 
 
even further, and could cause employees to make their initial choice less thoughtfully. On the 
other hand, flexibility is valuable if employees make a mistake in their initial choice, or if their 
circumstances change. 
All states with a DC-only plan remove at least one layer of complexity by automatically 
enrolling employees in the DC plan with an employer contribution that is not contingent on 
employee choices. Most go a step further by also requiring a fixed contribution on the part of 
employees, some at relatively high rates. The default investment fund in these plans is typically a 
target date fund. Although target date funds are not perfect, they are diversified across multiple 
asset classes and automatically become less risky as the participant ages.
19 
The complexity in public DC plans comes from the optional supplemental savings plans, 
in which employees must determine their appropriate contribution rates and asset allocations. As 
noted in Section I, not all DB and primary DC plans generate high retirement income 
replacement rates for all public sector workers, resulting in the need to utilize these supplemental 
plans. Some aspects of the supplemental plans‘ complexity seem unnecessary. For example, a 
state may have one provider administering its primary DC plan with one set of investment 
options, another provider with a completely different set of investment options managing its first 
supplemental plan, and yet another provider with a third set of investment options for its second 
supplemental plan. If there are multiple supplemental plans, employees who want to augment 
their primary benefits would have to choose which supplemental plan to use first. Like the choice 
between a DB and a DC plan discussed above, this is not necessarily a straightforward decision. 
  Another source of complexity in both DB and DC plans is the process of transforming 
accumulated benefits into retirement income. Most private sector DC plans do not have an 
annuitization option within the plan, so accumulated balances are not automatically converted 
into a payment stream upon retirement. Rather, retirees must take some action to convert their 
plan balances into an annuity, or they must self-manage spending down their wealth in 
retirement. In the private sector DC plans that do offer an annuity option, the take-up rate of this 
option is quite low. The low rate of annuitization both within and outside of DC plans is often 
referred to as the ―annuity puzzle‖ because it goes against theoretical predictions that individuals 
                                                             
19 Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus, and Yamaguchi (2007) find that 401(k) participants who are 100% invested in a target 
date fund tend to have the target date fund as their asset allocation default. Nessmith and Utkus (2008) find that just 
over half of target date fund 401(k) investors allocate their entire 401(k) to that one target date fund, while the 
remaining target date investors combine the target date fund with other investment options. 19 
 
should have a strong demand for annuities to insure against longevity risk (Yaari, 1965; Brown, 
2007).
20 Within-plan annuitization options are somewhat more prevalent in the public sector than 
in the private sector. Of the 12 states that have a DC-only or a hybrid DB/DC plan, half have an 
option within the plan for employees to annuitize their wealth upon retirement.
21  
  In contrast, both private and public sector DB plans have traditionally paid out accrued 
benefits as either a single or as a joint and survivor life annuity. But many DB plans have started 
to offer a lump sum payout option. Mitchell (1999) reports that in 1991, when aggregate data on 
lump sum payout options were first collected, only 14% of private sector DB plan participants 
had the option of a lump sum payout. By 2005, more than half (52%) of private sector DB plan 
participants had a lump sum option available (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2007). Anecdotal discussions with those in the pension and retirement savings industry 
suggest that when a lump sum option is available, the majority of participants elect the lump 
sum. So the trend in private sector DB plans is towards decreased levels of annuitization. Public 
sector DB plans are still more aggressive in promoting annuitization. Only a third of states allow 
employees the option of taking a lump sum withdrawal, and in most of these, the lump-sum 
payout is limited to the equivalent of a few years of annuitized benefits.
22 
 
IV. Conclusions 
  In this paper, we have provided an overview of the public sector pension landscape in the 
U.S. Although DB plans remain the predominant primary plan, some jurisdictions—particularly 
at the state level—have opted to offer only a DC plan or have given employees a choice among a 
DB, DC, and hybrid DB/DC plans. All jurisdictions have one or more supplemental DC plans 
available to employees. 
                                                             
20 Chalmers and Reuter (2009) and Previtero (2010) show that annuitization rates vary negatively with recent equity 
market returns, perhaps reflecting shifts in workers‘ confidence in their ability to generate high returns by investing 
their savings on their own. Hu and Scott (2007), Brown, Kling, Mullainathan and Wrobel (2008), and Agnew, 
Anderson, Gerlach and Szykman (2008) argue that annuity demand is affected by framing, i.e., the arbitrary mental 
filter through which individuals interpret the annuity choice. 
21 Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and Washington have a mechanism for converting DC balances into an annuity. 
Michigan facilitates annuitization of DC balances through a platform that gives participants competing quotes from 
several different annuity providers. 
22 Retirees may take their entire benefit as a lump sum in Delaware, Kentucky, Pennsylvania and South Dakota. In 
Oregon and Wisconsin, retirees may only take their entire benefit as a lump sum if the monthly annuity benefit to 
which they are entitled is below a low threshold. The following states allow a partial lump sum payout: Arizona, 
Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Utah and Virginia. 20 
 
  We document substantial heterogeneity across jurisdictions in the extent to which their 
DB, DC, or hybrid DB/DC plans automatically set employees up for high retirement income 
replacement rates. Employees in plans that will provide them with less automatic savings 
probably need to engage in some supplemental savings in order to maintain their standard of 
living in retirement. The need for supplemental savings is particularly high for low-tenured 
workers who may not vest in a DB plan or who may only partially vest in a DC plan. 
  We conclude by discussing how recent behavioral economics research on savings and 
investing behavior applies to the institutions and choices that employees face in public sector 
retirement plans. Most public sector DC plans do not allow employees any choice in how much 
gets contributed to the plan, and employees‘ assets are directed by default into target date 
retirement funds. By limiting the amount of choice employees have in the primary DC plan, 
public sector retirement plan designers are likely to have eliminated most of the left tail of 
savings outcomes that arise in private sector DC plans due to financial illiteracy, procrastination, 
and time-inconsistent tastes for immediate consumption gratification, although it is unknown 
how large of a welfare cost reducing choice exacts due to rational employees‘ reduced ability to 
smooth marginal utility intertemporally. Public sector supplemental DC plans are typically more 
complicated and confusing than those found in the private sector, since there are often multiple 
supplemental plans offered, and since each supplemental plan may be operated by a different 
financial services company. More research is needed to determine why the supplemental plans 
are structured as they are and how variation in their structure affects how well public sector 
employees do when faced with these types of choices.References 
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FIGURE 1. State Retirement Plan Replacement 
Rates Over Time
45-degree line 
Table 1A. Primary Retirement and Savings Plans Available to Newly Hired General State Employees 
State   Primary plan  State   Primary plan 
Alabama  DB   Montana  Choice of DB or DC 
Alaska  DC   Nebraska  Cash balance  
Arizona  DB   Nevada  DB  
Arkansas  DB   New Hampshire  DB  
California  DB   New Jersey  DB  
Colorado  Choice of DB or DC  New Mexico  DB  
Connecticut  DB   New York  DB  
Delaware  DB   North Carolina  DB  
District of Columbia  DC   North Dakota
a  DB 
Florida  Choice of DB or DC  Ohio  Choice of DB, DC, or hybrid DB/DC 
Georgia  Hybrid DB/DC  Oklahoma  DB  
Hawaii  DB  Oregon  Hybrid DB/DC 
Idaho  DB   Pennsylvania  DB  
Illinois  DB   Rhode Island  DB  
Indiana  Hybrid DB/DC  South Carolina  Choice of DB or DC 
Iowa  DB   South Dakota  DB  
Kansas  DB   Tennessee  DB  
Kentucky  DB   Texas  DB  
Louisiana  DB   Utah
b  DB 
Maine  DB   Vermont  DB  
Maryland  DB   Virginia  DB  
Massachusetts  DB   Washington  Choice of DB or hybrid DB/DC 
Michigan  DC   West Virginia  DB  
Minnesota  DB   Wisconsin  DB  
Mississippi  DB   Wyoming  DB  
Missouri  DB      
aNorth Dakota gives a small group of state employees (<10%) a choice between a DB and a DC plan. 
bStarting in 2011, Utah state employees will have a choice between a hybrid DB/DC plan and a DC plan. 
    
Table 1B. Primary Retirement and Savings Plans Available to Newly Hired General County and City Employees 
County  Primary plan  City   Primary plan 
Los Angeles County, CA  DB  New York City, NY  DB 
Cook County, IL  DB  Los Angeles, CA  DB 
Harris County, TX  Cash balance  Chicago, IL  DB 
Maricopa County, AZ  DB  Houston, TX  DB 
Orange County, CA  Choice of DB or hybrid DB/DC  Phoenix  DB 
San Diego County, CA  DB  Philadelphia, PA  DB 
Kings County, NY  DB  San Antonio, TX  Cash balance 
Miami-Dade County, FL  DB  Dallas, TX  DB 
Dallas County, TX  Cash balance  San Diego, CA  Hybrid DB/DC 
Queens County, NY  DB  San Jose, CA  DB 
Wayne County, MI  Hybrid DB/DC  Detroit, MI  DB 
San Bernardino County, CA  DB  San Francisco, CA  DB 
Riverside County, CA  DB  Jacksonville, FL  Choice of DB or DC 
King County, WA  Choice of DB or hybrid DB/DC  Indianapolis, IN  Hybrid DB/DC 
Broward County, FL  DB  Austin, TX  DB 
Clark County, NV  DB  Columbus, OH  Choice of DB, DC, or Hybrid DB/DC 
Santa Clara County, CA  DB  Fort Worth, TX  DB 
Tarrant County, TX  Cash balance  Charlotte, NC  DB 
New York County, NY  DB  Memphis, TN  DB 
Bexar County, TX  Cash balance  Boston, MA  DB 
    
Table 2. Joe the Bachelor’s Automatic Retirement Income Replacement Rates: Summary Statistics 
  Work history scenario 
  A 
0 yrs. private 
40 yrs. public 
B 
0 yrs. private 
35 yrs. public 
C 
5 yrs. private 
30 yrs. public 
D 
30 yrs. private 
5 yrs. public 
E 
15 yrs. private 
20 yrs. public 
F 
20 yrs. public 
15 yrs. private 
  $50,000 final salary 
DB-only plans             
 Minimum replacement rate  85%  79%  69%  42%  65%  48% 
 Mean replacement rate  129%  121%  113%  61%  96%  76% 
 Maximum replacement rate  163%  150%  138%  74%  122%  98% 
Hybrid DB/DC plans             
 Minimum replacement rate  51%  44%  37%  49%  41%  33% 
 Mean replacement rate  96%  90%  84%  55%  75%  62% 
 Maximum replacement rate  125%  118%  111%  66%  95%  79% 
DC-only plans             
 Minimum replacement rate  0%  0%  0%  41%  15%  18% 
 Mean replacement rate  32%  32%  32%  48%  38%  39% 
 Maximum replacement rate  53%  53%  53%  53%  53%  53% 
   $100,000 final salary 
DB-only plans             
 Minimum replacement rate  86%  80%  70%  34%  63%  49% 
 Mean replacement rate  120%  111%  101%  50%  83%  66% 
 Maximum replacement rate  154%  141%  129%  64%  107%  83% 
Hybrid DB/DC plans             
 Minimum replacement rate  53%  46%  38%  38%  43%  35% 
 Mean replacement rate  84%  78%  72%  44%  64%  54% 
 Maximum replacement rate  109%  101%  93%  54%  81%  67% 
DC-only plans             
 Minimum replacement rate  0%  0%  0%  32%  15%  18% 
 Mean replacement rate  24%  24%  24%  37%  30%  31% 
 Maximum replacement rate  41%  41%  31%  41%  41%  41% 
Source: Authors‘ calculations. 
Table 3. Characteristics of State Primary Defined Contribution Retirement Savings Plans 
 
States with primary DC plan only 
 
Participation 
Employee 
contributions 
Employer  
contributions 
Investment  
options  Vesting  
 Alaska  Automatic and 
immediate 
Mandatory 8%  5% non-contingent 
contribution 
10 funds, target date 
fund default 
100% after 5 years 
0-0-25-50-75-100 
 Michigan  Automatic and 
immediate 
Optional up to 100%  4% non-contingent 
contribution; 100% match 
on employee contributions 
up to 3% of pay 
22 funds, fixed 
income default 
100% after 4 years 
0-0-50-75-100 
 Washington DC  Automatic  
after 1 yr. service 
None  5% non-contingent 
contribution 
17 funds, target date 
fund default 
100% after 5 years 
0-0-20-40-60-100 
 
States with choice of primary plan that includes DC-only option 
 
Participation 
Employee 
contributions 
Employer  
Contributions 
Investment  
Options  Vesting  
 Colorado  Opt-in  Mandatory 8% if DC 
plan chosen 
10.15% non-contingent 
contribution 
21 funds, balanced 
fund default 
100% after 5 years 
50-60-70-80-90-100 
 Florida  Opt-in  None  9% non-contingent 
contribution 
20 funds, balanced 
fund default 
100% after 1 year 
0-100 
 Montana  Opt-in  Mandatory 6.9% if 
DC plan chosen 
4.19% non-contingent 
contribution 
15 funds, balanced 
fund default 
100% after 5 years 
0-0-0-0-0-100 
 North Dakota
a  Opt-in  Mandatory 4% if DC 
plan chosen 
4.12% non-contingent 
contribution 
20 funds + brokerage 
window, default 
unspecified 
100% after 4 years 
0-0-50-75-100 
 South Carolina  Opt-in  Mandatory 6.5% if 
DC plan chosen 
5% non-contingent 
contribution 
83 funds, target date 
default fund 
Immediate 
 Ohio  Opt-in  Mandatory 10% if 
DC plan chosen 
8.73% non-contingent 
contribution 
16 funds, target date 
default fund 
100% after 5 years 
0-20-40-60-80-100 
 Utah (starts 2011)  NA  Allowed  10% non-contingent 
contribution 
NA  100% after 4 years 
aNorth Dakota gives a small group of state employees (<10%) a choice between a DB and a DC plan.  
Table 4. Plan Defaults in States that Offer a Choice of Primary Plan 
 
State 
Retirement  
plan options 
Fraction of new employees 
electing each option  
Colorado  Defined Benefit (default)  -- 
  Defined Contribution  -- 
Florida  Defined Benefit (default)  79%
a 
  Defined Contribution  21%
 a 
Montana  Defined Benefit (default)  -- 
  Defined Contribution  -- 
North Dakota  Defined Benefit (default)  -- 
  Defined Contribution  -- 
Ohio  Defined Benefit (default)  87%
b 
  Hybrid DB/DC  5.6%
 b 
  Defined Contribution  7.4%
 b 
South Carolina  Defined Benefit (default)  ~85%
 c 
  Defined Contribution  ~15%
 c 
Washington   Hybrid DB/DC (default)  81%
d 
  Defined Benefit   19%
 d 
We calculate the fraction of new employees electing each option from the annual reports 
of the states that report active members by year for each plan.
 
a Florida: the fraction of new employees hired between 2000 to 2009  
b Ohio: the fraction of new employees hired between 2003 and 2008 
c South Carolina: rough estimate from a state employee in the South Carolina pension 
office (personal communication) 
d Washington: the fraction of new employees hired between 2002 and 2008 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix A: Calculation of Retirement Income Replacement Rates 
 
  Our calculation of the automatic retirement income replacement rates used in Table 2 
(and Appendix Table B1) incorporates both the defined benefit pension and Social Security 
income available to state retirees. We do not transform accumulated defined contribution 
retirement wealth into an income stream in retirement. 
 
Assumptions 
  Our calculations of automatic retirement income replacement rates are based on a stylized 
public sector employee, Joe the Bachelor. We make the following assumptions: 
  Joe was born on January 2, 1945
1 and entered the labor force in either 1970 (if he has a 
40 year career) or 1975 (if he has a 35 year career). 
  Joe retires on December 31, 2009, just before his 65
th birthday, so that he has no labor 
income in the year in which he turns 65. 
  Joe is single when he retires, has never been married, and has no dependents. 
  Joe’s earnings trajectory is independent of the sector in which he is employed.  
  Joe retires with a final average salary of either $50,000 or $100,000. 
  Joe’s earnings grow at a real annual rate of 1 percent until age 60, at which point his 
earnings are constant in nominal terms at either $50,000 or $100,000 until he retires. This 
makes Joe’s final average salary, which is used in the defined benefit pension formulas, 
the same as his final salary in the majority of states. 
  We calculate Joe’s nominal wage profile up until age 60 from his real wage profile using 
the Social Security Administration wage index factors. Note that Social Security only 
indexes wages up through age 60. 
  In calculating Joe’s defined benefit pension income, we assume that Joe was covered 
throughout his career by the plan rules in effect for newly eligible employees in 2010. 
  In Figure 1, we also calculate Joe’s defined benefit pension income assuming that Joe 
was covered by the plan rules in effect for newly eligible employees on January 1, 1975. 
                                                 
1 We assume that Joe’s birthday is on January 2, 1945 rather than January 1, 1945 because federal tax law uses Joe’s 
age on January 1 in determining whether Joe can claim an additional exemption for being age 65 in the computation 
of Joe’s tax liability for the previous calendar year. Tax laws in several states have a similar provision.  
Calculating Defined Benefit Pension Income for State Employees 
We calculate the public pension benefits for all states (plus the District of Columbia) that 
have either a defined benefit or a hybrid DB/DC plan for their general employees. If a state 
retirement plan has a hybrid DB/DC structure, we only count the defined benefit portion of the 
available retirement benefit towards the automatic replacement rate. The state’s pension 
contribution to the automatic replacement rate is zero for states with defined contribution or cash 
balance plans. It is also zero for the defined contribution portion of states’ hybrid DB/DC plans. 
If Joe does not satisfy his plan’s vesting rules under a particular scenario, then he is 
ineligible to receive a pension benefit. If Joe satisfies the vesting rules, we calculate his normal, 
unreduced yearly retirement benefit using the plan rules in place for newly eligible employees in 
2010. Even though Joe is not a newly eligible employee in 2010, this gives us a measure of the 
pension plan generosity in place for new employees like Joe going forward. For Figure 1, we 
also calculate the pension benefit Joe would receive under the plan rules in place for newly 
eligible employees on January 1, 1975. If the state subsequently increased its pension plan 
generosity, we assume that Joe switched to the newer plan that provides a greater future 
retirement benefit if he is offered the option of changing plans.  
For every scenario, we calculate Joe’s pension income assuming a pre-retirement final 
salary of $50,000 or $100,000. We calculate Joe’s final average salary, which is used in each 
state’s defined benefit pension benefit formula, from Joe’s nominal earnings profile. His years of 
credited service consist solely of his public sector tenure, which varies by scenario. Once we 
have calculated the yearly pension benefit provided by each plan, we compare these amounts 
with the plan’s minimum and maximum allowances, if they exist, and modify his pension 
benefits if necessary to satisfy these constraints. 
  
Calculating Social Security Benefits for State Employees 
We assume that Joe claims his Social Security benefit when he retires in 2010 at age 65. 
In order to calculate the benefit amount, we take the lower of Joe’s nominal earnings and the 
maximum Social Security taxable earnings for each year of his career. We index the resulting 
values by multiplying them by the Social Security Administration wage index factors. To obtain 
Joe’s average indexed monthly earnings (AIME), we sum the 35 years of highest indexed earnings, divide by 420 (= 35 years × 12 months), and round to the nearest lower dollar. Using 
the 2007 bend points of $680 and $4,100, we multiply the first $680 of the AIME by 0.9, the 
amount over $680 and less than or equal to $4,100 by 0.32, and the amount over $4,100 by 0.15. 
We add the three values generated from the previous step and round to the nearest lower 10 cents 
to get the primary insurance amount (PIA). To account for cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), 
the PIA is increased beginning in 2007, the year that Joe reaches age 62. We multiply his PIA by 
the 2007 COLA factor and round the resulting amount to the nearest lower 10 cents. We repeat 
this process using the 2008 COLA factor. In effect, we obtain the full monthly Social Security 
benefit. However, since Joe chooses to receive his benefit prior to reaching the normal Social 
Security retirement age of 66 for individuals in his birth cohort, his benefit is reduced. In Joe’s 
case, his benefit is reduced by 5/9 of 1 percent for each of the 12 months that he receives a 
benefit before age 66. After making this reduction, we multiply the revised monthly benefit by 
12 to obtain his annual Social Security benefit. 
In states whose general employees are covered by Social Security, Joe is entitled to the 
above benefit. In states whose employees do not participate in Social Security, Joe only receives 
a Social Security benefit if he has at least 10 years of substantial earnings through private sector 
employment. If Joe has fewer than 30 years of creditable earnings, Joe’s benefit is reduced in 
accordance with the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP). In states without Social Security 
participation, the WEP is relevant in scenarios E and F (in which Joe has 15 years of private 
sector employment and 20 years of public sector employment). Under these scenarios in states 
without Social Security participation, we change the 0.9 multiplicative factor for the first 2007 
bend point to 0.4 and compute the resulting Social Security benefit.  
 
Calculating State and Federal Income Taxes 
Before retirement, we assume that Joe’s only source of income is his salary. Once Joe 
retires at age 65, we assume that his public pension and Social Security benefits are his only 
sources of income. Using the NBER’s TAXSIM, we calculate Joe’s federal income tax liability 
using the 2009 tax rules (the most recent effective tax rules). We assume that Joe takes the 
standard deduction and does not itemize. Because TAXSIM does not distinguish between public 
and private sector pensions in calculating state income tax liabilities, and because many states 
have preferential tax treatment for public sector pension income (Table A1), we calculate state liabilities on our own using the 2009 tax rules. If Joe is employed, we subtract his public sector 
pension contributions, if made on a pre-tax basis, from his income. We then subtract the 
applicable state-level personal exemption and standard deduction from his salary to calculate his 
state-level taxable income before retirement. If Joe is retired, we first subtract state individual 
income exemptions for public pensions and Social Security, if applicable, from Joe’s respective 
public pension income and Social Security income. Next, we add together the remaining taxable 
pension and Social Security income. We then subtract applicable state-level personal exemptions 
and standard deductions, giving us Joe’s post-retirement taxable income at the state level. For 
both employed Joe and retired Joe, if Joe’s state taxable income is zero or negative, we assume 
that he has zero state individual income tax liability. Otherwise, we apply the state individual 
income tax brackets to his taxable income and calculate his initial state tax liability. From this 
tax liability we subtract any tax credits for which Joe is eligible (for example, some states have 
special tax credits for either older individuals with retirement income or for individual who are 
single). The remaining amount, as long as it is non-negative, represents his state individual 
income tax liability; otherwise, we assume that Joe has zero state tax liability.  
 
Calculating Retirement Income Replacement Rates 
The numerator of Joe’s automatic retirement income replacement rate is the sum of his 
public pension and his Social Security benefit minus his federal and state income taxes. The 
denominator of his automatic replacement rate is his gross pre-retirement income. We calculate 
Joe’s gross pre-retirement income as his public sector salary minus any mandatory state pension 
plan contributions and minus his federal and state income taxes and his portion of the FICA tax 
(for states whose employees participate in Social Security). We divide the numerator by the 
denominator to obtain Joe’s automatic retirement income replacement rate. 
 
   Appendix Table A1. State Participation in Social Security for Newly Hired General Public 
Employees and the State Taxation of Public Pension Benefits 
State 
Part of 
Social 
Security 
Has an 
Income 
Tax  State Taxation of State Pension Benefits 
Alabama  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully excluded from taxable income 
Alaska  No  No  No personal income tax 
Arizona  Yes  Yes  $2,500 public pension exclusion 
Arkansas  Yes  Yes  $6,000 public pension exclusion 
California  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully taxed 
Colorado  No  Yes  $24,000 exclusion for Social Security and public and 
other qualified pension income for those 65+ 
Connecticut  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully taxed 
Delaware  Yes  Yes  $12,500 public pension exclusion for those 60+ 
District of Columbia  Yes  Yes  $3,000 pension income exclusion for those 62+ 
Florida  Yes  No  No personal income tax 
Georgia  Yes  Yes  $35,000 retirement income exclusion 
Hawaii  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully excluded from taxable income 
Idaho  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully taxed 
Illinois  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully excluded from taxable income 
Indiana  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully taxed 
Iowa  Yes  Yes  $24,000 public pension exclusion 
Kansas  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully excluded from taxable income 
Kentucky  Yes  Yes  $41,110 public pension exclusion 
Louisiana  No  Yes  Public pension fully excluded from taxable income 
Maine  No  Yes  Exclusion of $6,000 minus Social Security benefits 
Maryland  Yes  Yes  $24,500 pension exclusion for those 65+ 
Massachusetts  No  Yes  Public pension fully excluded from taxable income 
Michigan   Yes  Yes  Public pension fully excluded from taxable income 
Minnesota  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully taxed 
Mississippi  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully excluded from taxable income 
Missouri  Yes  Yes  May deduct the greater of $6,000 or 50% of public 
pension for those 62+; pension exemption limited to 
the amount of Social Security income 
Montana  Yes  Yes  Pension exclusion of up to $3,600 if Adjusted Gross 
Income < $30,000 
Nebraska  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully taxed 
Nevada  No  No  No personal income tax 
New Hampshire  Yes  No  No personal income tax 
New Jersey  Yes  Yes  $15,000 pension exclusion for those age 62+ if AGI 
≤ $100,000 New Mexico  Yes  Yes  Retirement income exclusion of up to $2,500 for 
those with AGI ≤ $39,667 
New York  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully excluded from taxable income 
North Carolina  Yes  Yes  $4,000 public pension exclusion 
North Dakota  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully taxed 
Ohio  No  Yes  Retirement income tax credit of up to $200 if 
retirement income ≥ $500 
Oklahoma  Yes  Yes  Retirement income exclusion of up to $10,000 
Oregon  Yes  Yes  Tax credit of up to 9% of pension income if 
household income < $22,500 
Pennsylvania  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully excluded from taxable income 
Rhode Island  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully taxed 
South Carolina  Yes  Yes  Public pension exclusion of up to $15,000 for those 
65+ 
South Dakota  Yes  No  No personal income tax 
Tennessee  Yes  No  No personal income tax 
Texas  Yes  No  No personal income tax 
Utah  Yes  Yes  Tax credit of up to $450 
Vermont  Yes  Yes  Public pension fully taxed 
Virginia  Yes  Yes  Pension exclusion of up to $12,000 for those 65+ 
Washington  Yes  No  No personal income tax 
West Virginia  Yes  Yes  $2,000 public pension exclusion; additional 
retirement income exclusion for those age 65+ 
Wisconsin  Yes  Yes  $5,000 pension exclusion for those 65+ if Adjusted 
Gross Income < $15,000 
Wyoming  Yes  No  No personal income tax 
Note: State participation in Social Security is categorized for newly hired public sector 
employees. Some states in which newly hired employees are part of the Social Security system 
have older cohorts of employees that are not a part of Social Security. 
   Appendix Figure A1. Joe the Bachelor’s Retirement Income  
Replacement Rates under Various Scenarios 
(Final Average Salary of $50,000 Annually) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: States whose general public employees do not participate in Social Security have a black border.   
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(A) $50K FAS: 0 Years in the Private Sector, 40 Years in the Public Sector
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(B) $50K FAS: 0 Years in the Private Sector, 35 Years in the PublicSector
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(C) $50K FAS: 5 Years in the Private Sector, 30 Years in the Public Sector
Cash Balance Plan DB Plan DC Plan Hybrid DB/DC PlanAppendix Figure A1 (cont’d). Joe the Bachelor’s Retirement Income  
Replacement Rates under Various Scenarios 
(Final Average Salary of $50,000 Annually) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: States whose general public employees do not participate in Social Security have a black border. 
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(D) $50K FAS: 30 Years in the Private Sector, 5 Years in the Public Sector
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(E) $50K FAS: 15 Years in the Private Sector, 20 Years in the Public Sector
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(F) $50K FAS: 20 Years in the Public Sector, 15 Years in the Private Sector
Cash Balance Plan DB Plan DC Plan Hybrid DB/DC PlanAppendix Figure A2. Joe the Bachelor’s Retirement Income  
Replacement Rates under Various Scenarios 
(Final Average Salary of $100,000 Annually) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: States whose general public employees do not participate in Social Security have a black border. 
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(A) $100K FAS: 0 Years in the Private Sector, 40 Years in the Public Sector
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(B) $100K FAS: 0 Years in the Private Sector, 35 Years in the PublicSector
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(C) $100K FAS: 5 Years in the Private Sector, 30 Years in the Public Sector
Cash Balance Plan DB Plan DC Plan Hybrid DB/DC PlanAppendix Figure A2 (cont’d). Joe the Bachelor’s Automatic Retirement Income  
Replacement Rates under Various Scenarios 
(Final Average Salary of $100,000 Annually) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: States whose general public employees do not participate in Social Security have a black border.  
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(D) $100K FAS: 30 Years in the Private Sector, 5 Years in the Public Sector
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(E) $100K FAS: 15 Years in the Private Sector, 20 Years in the Public Sector
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(F) $100K FAS: 20 Years in the Public Sector, 15 Years in the Private Sector
Cash Balance Plan DB Plan DC Plan Hybrid DB/DC PlanAppendix Table B2. Joe the K-12 Teacher’s Retirement Income Replacement Rates: Summary Statistics 
  Work history scenario 
  A 
0 yrs. private 
40 yrs. public 
B 
0 yrs. private 
35 yrs. public 
C 
5 yrs. private 
30 yrs. public 
D 
30 yrs. private 
5 yrs. public 
E 
15 yrs. private 
20 yrs. public 
F 
20 yrs. public 
15 yrs. private 
  $50,000 final salary 
DB-only plans             
 Minimum replacement rate  82%  77%  67%  42%  62%  43% 
 Mean replacement rate  125%  118%  109%  60%  92%  72% 
 Maximum replacement rate  163%  150%  138%  70%  115%  91% 
Hybrid DB/DC plans             
 Minimum replacement rate  48%  43%  37%  49%  41%  30% 
 Mean replacement rate  93%  87%  82%  55%  73%  60% 
 Maximum replacement rate  124%  117%  110%  66%  95%  79% 
DC-only plans             
 Minimum replacement rate  0%  0%  0%  41%  15%  15% 
 Mean replacement rate  20%  20%  20%  45%  29%  29% 
 Maximum replacement rate  53%  53%  53%  53%  53%  53% 
   $100,000 final salary 
DB-only plans             
 Minimum replacement rate  83%  78%  68%  33%  61%  44% 
 Mean replacement rate  118%  109%  99%  50%  81%  64% 
 Maximum replacement rate  155%  141%  128%  61%  99%  79% 
Hybrid DB/DC plans             
 Minimum replacement rate  50%  44%  38%  38%  42%  32% 
 Mean replacement rate  81%  76%  70%  45%  63%  52% 
 Maximum replacement rate  109%  101%  93%  54%  80%  67% 
DC-only plans             
 Minimum replacement rate  0%  0%  0%  32%  15%  15% 
 Mean replacement rate  15%  15%  15%  35%  25%  25% 
 Maximum replacement rate  41%  41%  41%  41%  41%  41% Appendix Figure B1. Joe the K-12 Teacher’s Retirement Income  
Replacement Rates under Various Scenarios 
(Final Average Salary of $50,000 Annually) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: States whose general public employees do not participate in Social Security have a black border.   
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(A) $50K FAS: 0 Years in the Private Sector, 40 Years in the Public Sector
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(B) $50K FAS: 0 Years in the Private Sector, 35 Years in the PublicSector
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(C) $50K FAS: 5 Years in the Private Sector, 30 Years in the Public Sector
Cash Balance Plan DB Plan DC Plan Hybrid DB/DC PlanAppendix Figure B1 (cont’d). Joe the K-12 Teacher’s Retirement Income  
Replacement Rates under Various Scenarios 
(Final Average Salary of $50,000 Annually) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: States whose general public employees do not participate in Social Security have a black border.   
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(D) $50K FAS: 30 Years in the Private Sector, 5 Years in the Public Sector
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(E) $50K FAS: 15 Years in the Private Sector, 20 Years in the Public Sector
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(F) $50K FAS: 20 Years in the Public Sector, 15 Years in the Private Sector
Cash Balance Plan DB Plan DC Plan Hybrid DB/DC PlanAppendix Figure B2. Joe the K-12 Teacher’s Retirement Income  
Replacement Rates under Various Scenarios 
(Final Average Salary of $100,000 Annually) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: States whose general public employees do not participate in Social Security have a black border.   
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(A) $100K FAS: 0 Years in the Private Sector, 40 Years in the Public Sector
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(B) $100K FAS: 0 Years in the Private Sector, 35 Years in the PublicSector
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(C) $100K FAS: 5 Years in the Private Sector, 30 Years in the Public Sector
Cash Balance Plan DB Plan DC Plan Hybrid DB/DC PlanAppendix Figure B2 (cont’d). Joe the K-12 Teacher’s Retirement Income  
Replacement Rates under Various Scenarios 
(Final Average Salary of $50,000 Annually) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: States whose general public employees do not participate in Social Security have a black border. 
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(D) $100K FAS: 30 Years in the Private Sector, 5 Years in the Public Sector
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(E) $100K FAS: 15 Years in the Private Sector, 20 Years in the Public Sector
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(F) $100K FAS: 20 Years in the Public Sector, 15 Years in the Private Sector
Cash Balance Plan DB Plan DC Plan Hybrid DB/DC Plan